ABSTRACT Via processing the computation intensive applications (apps) at the network edge, mobile edge computing (MEC) becomes a promising technology to enhance the ability of the user equipments (UEs). Most existing works usually focus on whether to offload or where to offload the apps under the premise that sufficient resources are owned by the network edge. However, the demand heterogeneity of UEs and the limitation of resources are usually failed to be considered. Since the limited resources may constrain the number of accessed UEs, how the MEC service providers (SPs) choose the UEs to serve while ensuring UEs' Quality of Service (QoS) is a key issue. Under this context, in this paper, we study the matching problem between the MEC SPs and the UEs in a multi-MEC and multi-UE scenario. Within this scenario, MEC SPs are equipped with limited wireless and computational resources. Auction theory is utilized to model the matching relationship between MEC SPs and UEs as the commodity trading. With this trading, UEs can obtain MEC service from SPs, when they successfully purchase the combinational resources (including computational and wireless resources) from SPs. To complete the auction process, a multi-round-sealed sequential combinatorial auction mechanism is proposed. The properties of the auction are proved and various simulation results are done to show that the proposed approach has better system performance compared with the existing algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION A. MOTIVATION
More and more resource-hungry applications like interactive gaming, augmented reality and face recognition are running on user equipments (UEs) [1] - [3] . Due to the physical size constraint, the UEs are usually resource-constrained, having limited computation capacity and battery life. As a result, it is hard to implement these resource-hungry apps at the UEs smoothly. To solve this problem, offloading the computation tasks to the cloud via wireless access is considered as a promising approach.
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) can augment the capacities of the UEs by offloading the computation tasks to a centrally controlled cloud infrastructure. However, the public clouds usually locate in remote location and higher transmission latency maybe generated, and thus resulting in the poor quality of experience (QoE). To tackle this problem, the cloudlet based MCC is proposed, in which the UEs offload the computation tasks to the cloud server via an onehope WiFi wireless access. In this way, the delay can be shorten, however, the ubiquitous service and the QoS of the large number of UEs cannot be guaranteed. To provide UEs with more reliable service and conquer the disadvantage of MCC and Cloudlet, MEC is proposed [4] - [6] , which enables computation offloading to the cloud server deployed at the edge of the radio access networks (e.g. 3G/4G base station, named as MEC SPs in this paper).
In recent year, studying the performance of computation offloading in the MEC networks has attracted much attention from researchers. However, in these works, the limitation of resources is largely failed to be considered. Besides, demand heterogeneity of the UEs is also ignored. Demand heterogeneity is defined as the demand differences between UEs. For example, some of the UEs need a short latency for higher QoE (e.g. interactive gaming), some other UEs with long latency tolerance may require more energy saving. Under this context, to provide better computational capacity to UEs, we should consider how to match MEC SPs with limited resources to UEs.
B. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we consider a network scenario with multiple MEC SPs and multiple UEs, where the MEC SPs are equipped with limited wireless and computational resources. Since MEC SPs are equipped with limited resources and UEs have heterogeneous demands, the MEC network is analogue to the real markets, where various participants transact commodities under certain regulations and try to gain profit. Among the best-known market-based allocation mechanisms, auctions are outstanding on both perceived fairness and allocation efficiency [7] . Therefore, in our work, it is appropriate to apply the auction method to solve the matching relationship between MEC SPs and UEs .
As shown in Fig. 1 , four elements are indispensable in one auction, which are seller, buyer, auctioneer and commodity. A seller is the one who possess some commodities. A buyer is the one who want to purchase the commodities to complete their own tasks (we may use bidder as the synonyms for "buyer" in this paper). Auctioneer acts as the executer to perform the auction and decides the winners and the payment to the seller. Commodity is the object traded between a buyer and a seller, each commodity has a valuation, based on which the buyer/seller agrees to buy/sell specified commodities. In general, valuation is a monetary evaluation of assets, which is an private information of the buyer/seller. In addition, a buyer's bid includes two parts: the requirements and the bidding price for the resources.
When applying the auction to model the matching relationship between MEC SPs and UEs, the MEC SPs take the role of the sellers and auctioneers, UEs act as the buyers. The wireless and computational resources are regarded as the commodities. To ensure UEs' heterogeneous demands, we adopt the combinatorial auction, in which one trading can be successfully agreed when a bundle of resources are allocated simultaneously to UEs. The bundle of resources includes both wireless and computational resources, and different resource combinations can cover different requirements of UEs. When employing the combinatorial auction mechanism, the following challenges emerges: 1) How to determine UEs' valuation on the bundle of resources; 2) How to choose the winners (the UEs that one SP will serve) for the MEC SPs; 3) How to decide the final payment of UEs submitted to the MEC SPs. To conquer the above problems and select appropriate MEC SPs for the UEs, we propose a MSSCA mechanism. The mechanism is composed of three factors: the bid strategy, winner determination and payment rule. With the bid strategy, the UEs sequentially submit their bids and valuations on the wireless and computational resources to the MEC SPs based on their QoS requirements. A multi-round auction mode is employed in case that the UEs misrepresent their bids. In the winner determination process, a two-dimensional Knapsack algorithm is used to determine whether the MEC SPs serve the accessed UEs. And then based on the payment rule, the final payments of UEs who win in the auction are determined.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as the follows:
• To achieve efficient computation offloading, we study the matching relationship in a network scenario with multiple MEC SPs and UEs, where the MEC SPs are equipped with limited wireless and computation resources.
• Considering UEs' demand heterogeneity, we select the MEC SP that can satisfy both the wireless and computational resource requirements of UEs as the serving SP.
In addition, we model the matching relationship between MEC SPs and UEs as the commodity trading process.
• We propose a multi-round sealed sequential combinatorial auction (MSSCA) mechanism to match the MEC SPs to UEs. This mechanism is composed of three important parts: the bid strategy, winner determination and payment rule. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, some related works are shown about computation offloading in MEC. In Section III the system model is described. In Section IV, the problem is formulated and In Section V, auction mechanism is designed. In Section VI some properties of the auction are proved. Various simulation results are given in Section VII. In Section VIII, we conclude this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the MEC networks, computation offloading is a key technology which enables the mobile devices to execute resourceintensive Apps on the MEC SPs. Much previous approaches have been done in this area. In [8] , authors present a survey about MEC, revealing the open research challenges and future directions. In [9] , authors study the computation offloading optimization schemes from a 5G perspective. The authors in [10] , [11] study whether to offload the tasks according to the network cost consumption. The authors in [12] , [13] propose an optimization scheme considering the joint wireless and computational resources allocation. In [14] , network interference is regarded as an important in the computation offloading scheme design. Considering saving the network energy cost , an energy efficient resource allocation scheme is studied for mobile edge computation offloading in [15] . The authors in [16] develop an online computation offloading algorithm for a MEC system with energy harvesting technology. In the works of [17] - [19] , the tradeoff between the energy and latency spent for task transmission and computation is studied.
Game theory is useful tool for the computation offloading scheme design. The authors of [20] formulate the offloading decision problem as a game problem, and an algorithm is design to achieve the Nash equilibrium. Manuscript [21] studies the computation offloading decision problem for multiUEs under a multi-channel interference environment, and adopts a game theoretic approach to maximize the number of UEs who offloaded computation tasks to the MEC. Each UE has a different computation task to be offloaded to the MEC SPs. The computation task of UE j can be expressed by (f j , s j ), where f j is the total number of CPU cycles required to accomplish the computation task, s j denotes the size of the task, which is related to the program codes and the input parameters. To finish one computation task smoothly, both the wireless and computational resources are required, where the wireless resources is used for task transmission while the computational resource is responsible for task computation. Based on this description, the matching of MEC SP and UE is equalized to the allocation of wireless and computational resources to UEs.
B. COMPUTATION OFFLOADING COST MODEL
In this section, we will introduce the computation offloading cost model in detail.
We assume that UEs intend to offload the computation tasks to the MEC SPs when the function of (1) and (2) are satisfied. The two functions mean that the cost generated by the local task computation at the UE is larger than the cost consumed by offloading the task to the network edge. Denote t j and e j be the overall delay and energy consumption when the task is executed remotely at the MEC SP, then we have:
where t j and e j mean the cost of delay and energy consumption when the task is computed locally at the UE. For t j and e j , we have
where P j is the transmission power of UE j. t t j and t e j denote the transmission and execution delay of the task, respectively. f j is the number of CPU cycles required by UE j.
) denotes the transmission rate of UE j. b ij represents the channel bandwith allocated to the UE. h ij denotes the channel gain between UE j and MEC SP i, N 0 denotes the background noise power.
For t j and e j , we have:
where t l j and e l j denote the task computation delay and energy consumption when the task is performed locally.
where F l j is the local computational rate of UE j, and P l j = 10 −11 F l j is the energy consumed per CPU cycle [22] . The number of required channels bandwidth b ij can be figured out from the expression of b ij = . And VOLUME 5, 2017 then the number of the requested subchannels m ij can be expressed by:
where ' ' is the ceiling function.
C. VALUATION AND BIDDING PRICE
We will discuss the valuation and bidding prices for the heterogeneous resources in this section. In an auction, the valuation is the maximum price that one UE is willing to pay for the commodities, which also means UEs' preference to the resources. This parameter is privately to the UE. It is more reasonable to value the resources according to UEs' performance improvement when utilizing these resources. Let v b j (q) be the valuation of q(1 ≤ q ≤ B) contiguous subchannels of UE j. Since the maximum throughput function is a concave non-decreasing function to the channel width, we define the valuation function of channels similarly to work in paper [23] :
where v b j (x) and v b j (y) denote the valuation of UE j on x contiguous and y contiguous channels.
Define the valuation function of computation resources as a linear function to the number of CPU cycles, the function can be denoted as:
where v c j (x) and v c j (y) denote the valuation of UE j on computational resources with x and y CPU cycles.
The bidding price of UE j on wireless and computation resources can be defined as the following:
where p b j (x) and p b j (y) denote the bidding price of UE j when x and y contiguous channels are required, and p c j (x) and p c j (y) denote the bidding price for computational resources of x and y CPU cycles.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we address the following problem: how to select the appropriate MEC SPs for UEs while achieving the maximum utility under the restriction of the limited resources.
Define the SP-UE matching matrix as X = {x ij } K ×N , where x ij ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator revealing whether MEC SP i can serve the UE j with a bundle of resources. If the resource requirement of UE j can be satisfied by MEC SP i, then we have x ij = 1, otherwise, x ij = 0. The matching matrix must satisfy the following constraint:
which ensures that one UE can only be served by at most one MEC SP. If UE j is allowed to be served by MEC SP i, then the UE should pay p b ij + p c ij to MEC SP i. Thus the utility of MEC SP i, gained from selling resources to UE j can be given by:
The overall utility of MEC SP i can be denoted as the follows:
U ij (16) According to the analysis above, our SP-UE matching problem can be formulated as the following:
Considering the limitation of resources on each MEC SP, we have the following constraints:
The optimization problem (16) is actually a 2-dimensional 0-1 knapsack problem that can be solved using dynamic programming [24] .
V. THE MULTI-ROUND SEALED SEQUENTIAL COMBINATORIAL AUCTION
In this section, we design a multi-round sealed sequential combinatorial auction (MSSCA) mechanism to solve the proposed problem.
A. AUCTION DESIGN
The auction is an efficient method for the resource allocation problem, in which the allocation efficiency can be achieved by the market competition. When applying the auction theory to solve our matching problem, the MEC SPs act as the sellers and auctioneers while the UEs act as the buyers. MEC SPs who own the wireless and computation resources want to lease out these resources to UEs. The UEs intend to buy the resources from the MEC SPs and complete the task computation. When a commodity trading is agreed between one MEC SP and one UE, the UE should pay monetary payment to the SP. The payment is decided by the auctioneer. To guarantee the utility for UEs, the final payment should not exceed the valuation of the UE. For the SPs, they have the responsibility for providing smooth computation offloading service to the UE via allocating channels and CPU cycles.
Considering the characteristics of the matching problem, our auction design should follow the rules below:
1) This auction is a combinational auction.
2) This auction is a multi-round auction.
In the MEC networks, computation offloading includes a communication procedure to transmit the computation task to the network edge and a computation process to execute the task. And thus, to complete the computation task, the UEs need both the wireless and computation resources. One trading in the auction can be agreed successfully between MEC SPs and UEs when both the two kinds of resources required by UEs are satisfied. Under this circumstance, our auction falls into the scope of combinatorial auction.
Moreover, we design our auction as a multi-round auction. According to the difference of the bidding behaviors, auctions can be divided into two categories: one-round and multi-round auction [7] . In one-round auction, all the bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the auctioneer determine the winners and match the appropriate buyers to the sellers. The one-round auction is not suitable for our multiple MEC-SP network scenario [25] . On one hand, in the oneround auction, the bidder can't decide from which seller the commodities can be bought. On the other hand, the one-round auction requires a central controller or coordination among the sellers, which is not practical for our network with multiple MEC SPs and UEs without a centralized controller. Thus, the multi-round auction is applied to our auction design.
B. AUCTION MECHANISM
According to the analysis above, the process of the MSSCA mechanism is shown in algorithm 1.
We define the maximum rounds of the auction be R. At each round, UEs perform Bid Submission firstly. They submit their resource requirements and bid vectors to all neighboring MEC SPs. After receiving the vector information from UEs, the MEC SPs perform the step of Winner Determination, checking their local wireless and computational resources and calculating the utilities. In this step, the UEs allowed to be served by the MEC SP are determined. In each round of auction, some UEs with lower bids will fall into the loser vector , where no UEs are served by the current MEC SPs. To make itself more competitive for other MEC SPs, the UE failed to be served in the last round of auction will improve the bidding price in the next round. The auction algorithm stops when the difference between the utilities of the current round and last round is below the threshold or the algorithm implementation rounds has achieved to the maximum number.
From the algorithm, it is obvious that three sub-processes plays an important role: the bidding strategy, winner determination and payment rule. The users' bidding strategy is designed as a multi-round mode. The winner determination is to determine which of the UEs can be served by UEs submit their resource requirement and bid vector to their preferred MEC SPs according to Bidding Strategy. 7 :
Winner Determination

9:
for j = 1 : N do 10: for i = 1 : K do 11: x = o ji ; 12: (U (x), X , ) = Knapsack(x); 13 :
= − {j};
17:
end if 18: end for 19: end for 20: if U temp − U < then 21: Auction complete ; 22: Break; 23: end if 24: Bid Improvement based on Algorithm2 (int j + 1); 25: end for 26: Output: Matching matrix X , payment P, utility U the MEC SPs. As to the payment rule, it intends to calculate the final price of UEs payed to the MEC SPs, while guaranteeing the properties of the auction. In the following, we will describe them in detail.
1) BIDDING STRATEGY
Each UE sorts the MEC SPs according to the distance between the UE and MEC SPs. Denote the MEC SP priority vector for UE j be O j = (o j1 , o j2 , . . . , o jK ), where ∀o jk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K } shows that MEC SP k is the k th SP that preferred by UE j. In each round of the auction, the UEs sequentially submit their bids to the MEC SPs in the priority vector. When one MEC SP agrees to serve the UE, the bid submission process will stop.
In MSSCA, since a multi-round auction mode is employed, i.e. the UEs can adjust their current bidding price according to the results of the last round. In the next round of the auction, the UEs that are not served in the last round will submit higher bids to win the SP, the bid improvement will stop until the bid 
2) WINNER DETERMINATION
The goal of the winner determination algorithm is to decide whether one MEC SP intends to serve the UE.
When UE j bids to MEC SP i, the SP figures out its own utility according to step 5 in Algorithm 3. As noted, we compare the utility of UE j with that of UE j−1. If the former is no higher than the latter, i.e. U (i, j, b, c) ≤ U (i, j − 1, b, c), then we have x ij = 0 and UE j is moved to the loser vector ( denotes the vector of the losers who failed to obtain service from the SP), otherwise, x ij = 1, UE j − 1 is moved to the loser vector α. In the next auction round, the UEs in will bid iteratively to the next SP for computation service.
3) PAYMENT RULE
The final price paid by the winners is determined by the payment scheme. The design of this part directly determines the properties of the auction mechanism. A carefully designed payment scheme can guarantee the truthfulness of the auction. An auction should be constructed while the price paid by the player is independent of his own bids (William Vickrey, 1961) [26] . Considering this, we adopt the sealed second price auction, in which the winner chooses the second high bidding price as the payment.
Denote the winners served by MEC SP i in the k th round of auction be
Output: Selection matrix X , Utility U , Losers group 3: for b = 1, · · · , B i do 4: for c = 1, · · · , C i do 5 :
if U (i, j, b, c) ≤ U (i, j − 1, b, c) = ∪ {j} 12: end if 13: end for 14: end for 15: return U (i, j, B i , C i ) , X , the number of the winners. We calculate the payment for channels and CPU cycles, respectively. For the channels, we group the winners by vector
is the number of the winner groups and |g b x | denotes the number of winners in the x th group. The winner groups in G b should satisfy the following relationship:
which means that all the winners are involved.
Which means that no winner can emerge in multiple groups. The bidding price of g b x can be defined as:
where p b xi denotes UE's bidding price for the channels. Assume that the bidding price of the winners for the channels in each group are sorted in a descending order:
According to the sealed second-price design, the payment of UE i for the channels in group g b x is given by:
For the CPU cycles, it has the similar payment determination process to the payment of channels.
VI. PROOF OF PROPERTIES
In this section, we prove the properties of the proposed auction, which are given in the following definitions and lemmas.
Definition 1: Individual rationality, the utility of the sellers and buyers should be no less than zero.
Definition 2: Budget balance, the gain of the auctioneer should be no less than zero, i.e., the overall charges from the buyers can't exceed total payments to the sellers.
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Lemma 1: The multi-round sealed sequential combinatorial auction is individual rational.
Proof: As described in expression (16) , the utility of the MEC SP is the total payments from the winning UEs. For the UEs, who are not served by MEC SPs, their utilities are 0. When the UE participates in the auction and wins, this UE pays for the channels and CPU cycles with the second higher bidding price, and thus the utility of UE should be not less than 0. Since the utilities of all the participants and MEC in the auction are non-negative, the proposed auction is individual rational.
Lemma 2: The multi-round sealed sequential combinatorial auction is budget balance.
Proof: As said before, the seller takes the role of the auctioneer. As shown in expression (15) , the overall payments to the seller are equal to the total charges from the buyers. Hence, the proposed auction is budget balance.
VII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed auction mechanism by numerical simulation results.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
We consider the scenario where the MEC SPs and UEs are randomly deployed in the area. The number of channels and CPU cycles are randomly chosen from {20, 30, 40}, the minimum separable unit of channel bandwidth and CPU cycles are 15kHz and 5GHz respectively. The transmission power is P j = 1.5W and the background noise is N 0 = −60 dBm [27] . And we set the channel gain be h ij = l −α ij , where l ij denotes the distance between MEC SP i and UE j. α = 4 denotes the pass-loss exponent [28] .
For the computation task, the data size is randomly chosen from [100, 1000]KB, and the total number of CPU cycles f j of the computation task is randomly chosen from [200, 1000] megacycle. The local computation capacity F l j of a UE is randomly assigned from the set of {1, 1.5, 2} GHz. For UE j' valuation, we first generate a unit valuation within [5, 10] , and then give the valuations of the set of channels and the bundle of CPU cycles separately according to the expression (10) and (11) . The initial bidding price is a half of the task valuation.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS
In simulation, we first study the convergence of the proposed algorithm MSSCA and then compare the performance of MSSCA to the candidate algorithms: One-shot Sealed Sequential Combinatorial Auction (OSSCA) and Random Sealed Combinatorial Auction (RSCA). OSSCA is an oneround auction, and within RSCA, MEC SPs randomly choose the winners under the condition that limited resources are owned by the MEC SPs. The simulation results are presented from Fig. 3 to Fig. 10 . Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the utility and the number of winners for MSSCA when the number of UEs are different, where In Fig. 3 , it shows that the lines increase with the increment of the number of UEs. When the number of UE becomes larger, the increment rate becomes slower. Finally, the rise is very small and the lines approach stable, which also means our proposed algorithm can achieve convergence. When the number of UEs is higher, MEC SPs can gain higher utility. This is because the utility of MEC SPs is the overall payments of UEs. More UEs exist in the network, a larger number of UEs can be served, which further leads to higher utility of MEC SPs.
In Fig. 4 , the lines reveal how the number of winners varies as the number of auction rounds increases. Firstly the lines decrease with a higher gradient, after reaching the bottom, the lines increase and finally achieve to a stable value. The variation of lines shows that the auction rounds should be set big enough to make the proposed algorithm achieve convergence. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 describe the utility and the number of winners under three different algorithms, the MSSCA, RSSCS and OSCA. As we can observe that the MSSCA and OSSCA perform better than RSCA, that is because the RSCA choses the winners in a random way. In Fig. 6 , the number of winners obtained by MSSCA and OSSCA are almost the same. The proposed MSSCA algorithm obtains a higher utility than OSSCA when the number of UEs is big enough. When the number of UEs is big, UEs should compete for the limited resources for the task computation. The MSSCA is able to select UEs that provide higher utiltiy. When the number of UEs is small, the utility obtained by MSSCA is almost the same as that obtained by OSSCA. That is because all the UEs can be served by the MEC SPs and there is little difference between the line depicted by the MSSCA and the one depicted by the OSSCA. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 compare the utility and the number of winners generated by three different algorithms, which are MSSCA, OSSCA and RSCA, respectively. The number of UEs is set to be N = 200. As we can see, MSSCA and OSSCA perform better than RSCA in the terms of the number of winners and the utility.
In addition, the utility lines of the three algorithms increase as the number of MEC SPs becomes larger. The increasing rate becomes slower and the lines become stable when the number of MEC SPs is larger. This happens due to the limitation of network resources. When the number of MEC SPs is small, the resources are limited and only part of the UEs can be served. The resources become sufficient when more MEC SPs are deployed. And meanwhile, more UEs can be served and the utility is improved. When the number of MEC SPs is big, enough resources are provided to all the UEs and the utility can be no more improved.
The lines of Fig. 7 And Fig. 8 have the same increment tendency. In Fig. 8 , the number of winners obtained by MSSCA and OSSCA are almost the same, and both the two lines increase when the number of MEC SPs improves. The improvement of lines is also influenced by the resource limitation. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the number of winners in each MEC SP under the algorithm of OSSCA and MSSCA. In Fig. 9 , utilizing OSSCA, we can see that MEC SP 1 serves more UEs than MEC SP 2 and 3. In Fig. 10 , after performing MSSCA, the number of winners in the three MEC SPs are almost the same. From comparing the two figures, it is obvious that our proposed MSSCA is able to provide better fairness to MEC SPs than that of OSSCA, which also means that the proposed MSSCA can highly utilize the network resource and avoid load imbalance. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the computation offloading in a multi-MEC and multi-UE scenario, where MEC service providers (SPs) are equipped with limited wireless and computation resources. We utilize auction model to describe the serving relationship between MEC SPs and UEs, where SPs and UEs are regarded as sellers and buyers, the resources of SPs are deemed as commodities. UEs can obtain service from SPs when SPs have sufficient resources while UEs can successfully purchase resources from SPs. To describe this process, we propose a multi-round sealed sequential combinatorial auction (MSSCA) mechanism. This mechanism is composed of three important parts: users' bid strategy, winners determination and the pricing process. The users' bid strategy is designed based on a multi-round priority rule, the winner determination process is formulated as a twodimensional Knapsack problem while the pricing process is modeled according to UEs' resource requirements. We also prove the properties of the auction and utilize various simulation results to show that the proposed approach has better performance compared to the existing algorithms.
